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Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s failure in the Soviet Union

On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued Führer Directive 21, an order to invade the Soviet Union. The German military plan envisioned an advance to a hypothetical line running from the port of Archangelsk in northern Russia to the port of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea—the so-called “AA Line.” This would bring most of the Soviet population and its economic potential under German control.

After a five-week delay while operations in Greece and Yugoslavia were conducted, Operation Barbarossa—named after the all-conquering medieval Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick I—was launched on June 22, 1941. Over three and a half million German and other Axis troops attacked along a 2,900-kilometer front. A total of 148 divisions—80 percent of the German army—were committed to the operation. Seventeen Panzer divisions, divided into four Panzer groups, formed the vanguard with 3,400 tanks. They were supported by 2,700 Luftwaffe aircraft. It was the largest invasion force to date.

German troops cross a bridge near the town of Jonava in Lithuania on June 28, 1941.
© IWM HU 8925
Tired German troops of Army Group North, their faces caked with dust, cross a bridge near Jonava, Lithuania. The infantry was expected to cover at least 32 kilometers per day, but they remained many kilometers behind the spearhead of the tanks.

The German armed forces were divided into three army groups, each with a specific objective. Army Group North was to advance through the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and capture Leningrad. Army Group South was to advance into Ukraine and capture Kyiv and the industrial region of Donbass (Donets Basin). Army Group Center’s objectives were Minsk, Smolensk, and then Moscow itself. Hitler expected these areas to be reached in about ten weeks.

The Soviets had massed large forces on their western border but were under orders not to provoke the Germans. Although Stalin was suspicious of Hitler, he didn’t believe he would attack so soon, despite the threatening German troop buildup and a barrage of intelligence warnings. He immediately had some 5 million men and a total of 23,000 tanks at his disposal, but the Red Army was still unprepared when the Germans struck.

The Germans got off to a good start. The Panzer groups advanced rapidly toward their objectives, while the Russian forces disintegrated in disarray. The Luftwaffe’s bombing of Soviet airfields, artillery positions, and troop concentrations was a great help. The Germans quickly gained air superiority. On the first day alone, 1,800 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, most of them on the ground. Army Group North, under Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, stormed toward Leningrad, spearheaded by General Erich Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4. The Russian forces in this sector were thinly spread, and the tanks covered 804 kilometers in three weeks. By mid-July, they were only 96 kilometers from their objective.

 

A destroyed Soviet T-34 tank and burning vehicles on a road in Russia.
© IWM HU 111380
A burning T-34 and other vehicles destroyed in the encirclement battles between Bialystok and Minsk. Soviet tank units were mistreated during Barbarossa, and the standard of crew training was poor. The early T-34s were also prone to mechanical failures.

Army Group Center, under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, also made rapid progress. By June 28, Panzer Group 2 under General Heinz Guderian and Panzer Group 3 under General Hermann Hoth had encircled three Russian armies and captured over 320,000 men in the Bialystok and Minsk pockets. The two Panzer groups then advanced and joined forces on July 27 on the other side of Smolensk to form another double encirclement. Two more Russian armies were surrounded and destroyed, and another 300,000 troops were taken prisoner.

Army Group South, under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, had the furthest advance ahead, and its attack also encountered the strongest Soviet resistance. The bulk of the Russian tanks were on this front. But by early July, von Rundstedt had already advanced across the pre-1939 Polish border. General Ewald von Kleist’s Panzer Group 1 was slowed by Soviet flank attacks on its way to Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine and a key region for the coal-rich Donets Basin. On August 8, the Germans encircled two Soviet armies, captured 100,000 men in the Uman Pocket, and reached the Dnieper River. The naval port of Odessa on the Black Sea was also besieged.

Panzer II tanks advance past a burning Russian village during Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941.
© IWM HU 111382
These light tanks were significantly inferior even to older Soviet models, but were used in some numbers during “Barbarossa” to offset the decline in production of the Panzer III and IV. Most were gone by 1942.

Up to this point, everything seemed to be going well. The only major problem was the time it took for the infantry to catch up with the tanks and destroy the Russian defenses. But Soviet resistance grew stronger, despite catastrophic losses. In a costly but successful counterattack, a German frontline salient near Yelnya, southeast of Smolensk, was recaptured.

 

Meanwhile, Army Group Center’s supply situation became critical. Hitler decided to halt the advance on Moscow and reinforce Army Groups North and South. Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 was sent north to support the thrust toward Leningrad, while Guderian’s tanks were to assist Army Group South in capturing Kyiv. The German High Command protested vehemently. The tanks were only 350 kilometers from Moscow. But Hitler considered the resource-rich Ukraine more important. On August 21, he ordered priority given to the conquest of Crimea and the Donets Basin.

A Panzerbefehlswagen Ausf. H (Panzer III) and motorcycles of General Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, part of Army Group Center, during Operation Barbarossa, summer 1941.
© IWM HU 111385
A Panzer III commando tank and dispatch rider from Guderian’s Panzer Group 2, part of Army Group Center. In August, Guderian protested vehemently against Hitler’s decision to halt the advance on Moscow and divert his troops south toward Kiev.

The Soviets were completely fooled by the German maneuvers. Five Soviet armies were trapped in a huge frontline around Kyiv. As usual, Stalin refused to authorize a withdrawal until the pocket was sealed. By the end of September, Kyiv had fallen, and over 650,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or captured. The Germans advanced along the Black Sea coast and into Crimea, laying siege to Sevastapol. In October, Kharkov fell, but the Germans were by then exhausted. The fighting had severely depleted their ranks, and supply lines were stretched to the limit. The Southern Front remained where it was for the time being. In the north, the German forces were also at their limits. In September, with the help of their Finnish allies, they cut Leningrad off from the rest of Russia, but they lacked the strength to take the city. Instead, Hitler ordered the city to be starved into submission. The siege of epic proportions was to last 890 days.

Portrait of three German soldiers in a Russian street.
© IWM HU 5059
German Landser, as ordinary infantry soldiers were called, smile into the camera in a Russian city. Despite heavy losses, morale remained high until the advance lost momentum in the fall and the weather worsened.

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